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A BETTER APPROACH TO DUAL USE CONCERNS 
VICTORIA SUTTON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Biological materials and research with the power to save lives, as well as 
the power to take them, have been deemed “dual use” technologies, 
research, or materials. The United States Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) has created a program known as “dual use research of 
concern” (DURC) as a way of creating a category for increased surveillance 
and scrutiny of these activities. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has 
adopted DURC as a process they will use when soliciting grants and awards 
involving research that may meet this definition.1 The definition of DURC 
from the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) is a good 
starting point. The definition is limited to research, but many other activities 
like manufacturing or translational activities could otherwise be dual use 
activities. The definition is as follows: “research that, based on current 
understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, 
products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose 
a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, 
animals, the environment or materiel.”2 
Internationally, the term has also been used as a focus for safeguarding 
research. The United Nations Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BWC) has included dual use monitoring as a possible Confidence Building 
Measure (CBM) to show party compliance.3 The Global Alert and Response 
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 1. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH POLICY ON MITIGATING RISKS OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE 
RESEARCH OF CONCERN (2013). 
 2. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. ON BIOSECURITY, PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT 
OF DUAL USE LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH: STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF 
RESEARCH INFORMATION 17 (2007). 
 3. Kelsey Gregg, Compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BWC), THE FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Aug. 3, 2010), http://blogs.fas.org/blog/2010/08/com 
pliance-with-the-biological-and-toxin-weapons-convention-bwc/. 
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(GAR) program of the World Health Organization (WHO) has also adopted 
a DURC program component.4 
Despite its widespread popularity as a term upon which to hang a 
program, this kind of focus may prove to have shortcomings. First, the use 
of this term has the result of shifting the presumption to the scientist to prove 
that the research will not be used to harm, and it creates an atmosphere of 
suspicion in a culture of research that has always been open and sharing. 
Second, it presumes that dual use biological materials can be identified to 
warrant this special treatment. Both of these shortcomings may distract from 
many other aspects of biosecurity if DURC is relied on as the primary 
method for controlling biological research and materials. Communication 
and collaboration may be better tools for monitoring and understanding the 
risks and should not be minimized in favor of the ease of using a “catchy” 
term. Biodiplomacy is that package of considerations that might prove to be 
more useful in meeting the goal of global biosecurity by including dual use, 
but not focusing on it as a centerpiece for a policy. 
The use of the term “biodiplomacy” is a kind of diplomacy, unique in its 
need to treat biological research and commercial activities with the kind of 
control that will prevent catastrophic consequences from misuse. The term 
takes the traditional meaning of the term public diplomacy,5 and applies it 
to this unique area. The traditional meaning was once articulated by former 
diplomat Edmund A. Gullion in 1966: “By public diplomacy we understand 
the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence 
the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way 
as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions.”6 But with time, the 
definition has come to embrace both the means as well as the results, and 
also includes actions taken domestically in response to pressures from 
international relations. 
The term “biodiplomacy” also extends to the strategy by which 
governments, private groups, and individuals influence the attitudes and 
opinions of other peoples and governments to create domestic and foreign 
policy concerning biological materials, equipment, and facilities to prevent 
making, using, or producing biological weapons. This is not required by the 
BWC, and the need to influence domestic policy with regard to individuals, 
 
 4. See Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC), WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who. 
int/csr/durc/en/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 5. Definitions of Public Diplomacy, TUFTS FLETCHER SCHOOL, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/ 
Murrow/Diplomacy/Definitions (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). The Fletcher School identifies the 
roots of public diplomacy originating in the 1960s but concludes that it has grown in scope 
beyond its traditional meaning. “Today it goes far beyond a classical definition involving how 
elected and appointed government officials communicate, argue and influence policies 
publicly to a more two-pronged concept involving cause and effect.” Id. 
 6. Id. 
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non-governmental organizations, and businesses in order to safeguard its 
life sciences could be accomplished through biodiplomacy. 
The definition of diplomacy implicitly includes “trust” as part of a 
strategy to encourage individuals and governments to be influenced by our 
views. In appealing to either a self-interest (in the case of an autocracy) or 
national interest (in the case of a democracy), a degree of trust is essential 
to make a convincing appeal in diplomacy. A diplomatic agreement is 
nothing more than a covenant of trust in a social contract between nations. 
The statement made by President George W. Bush after his first meeting with 
President Putin of Russia rings of that search for trust between nations when 
he expressed a mutual trust that came when he looked into his eyes and 
“was able to get a sense of his soul.”7 
Trust is also implicit in biodiplomacy, particularly where dual use 
concerns are at stake. Any suggestion of a lack of trust is fatal to a 
diplomatic social contract of mutual trust. So it follows, standards that 
suggest a nation cannot be trusted with biological materials, equipment, 
and facilities fail because they are rife with notions of untrustworthiness. 
Many biological materials, facilities, and equipment can have both 
malevolent and good uses, but deeming all of them suspect makes for a 
rocky start to biodiplomatic relations. The inescapable truth is that where the 
policy indicates that individuals cannot be trusted with biological materials, 
equipment, and facilities, the foundation of the policy is one of distrust. Trust 
is essential to developing a culture of responsibility and accountability with 
biological materials and equipment if biosecurity is to be genuinely achieved 
by the global community. 
The CBM of the BWC were first established to implement Articles V and 
X of the BWC at the Second Meeting of the Parties in 1986.8 The Sixth 
Conference revived the mechanism and gave it new importance in the 
implementation and compliance aspects of the BWC.9 This mechanism 
exemplifies trust in its objective — to build confidence. It would also 
 
 7. The President’s News Conference With President Vladimir Putin of Russia in Kranj,1 
PUB. PAPERS 685, 689 (June 16, 2001). “I found him to be very straightforward and 
trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul . . . .” Id. 
 8. Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on their Destruction, Final Declaration, 2, 7, U.N. Doc. BWC/Conf.II/13/II (1986) 
[hereinafter Second Review Confrence], available at http://www.opbw.org/rev_cons/2rc/docs/ 
final_dec/2RC_final_dec_E.pdf. 
 9. See Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and On Their Destruction, Final Document, 12, U.N. Doc BWC/Conf.VI/6 (2006) 
[hereinafter Sixth Review Confrence], http://www.opbw.org/rev_cons/6rc/docs/6/BWC_ 
CONF.VI_6_EN.pdf. 
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embrace the concept of dual use measures taken by a country, but is much 
broader in its options and possibilities. CBMs are difficult to assess for the 
public, however, because they are accepted with the promise of 
confidentiality, it makes them unavailable to the public where confidence 
could be further built.10 CBMs encompass a broader vision of enforcement 
of the BWC by the possibilities that can be captured by a nation’s culture 
and through legal traditions. 
The first part of this article examines the politics of public health, its 
globalization in politics, and the rise in the need for biodiplomacy. The 
second part discusses globalized governance and the use of international 
law and biodiplomacy. The third part discusses an approach to biological 
weapons deterrence based on models of risk of those countries most likely 
to have bioweapons activities and threats. Finally, the article will finish with 
some views and research for the future. 
II.  PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE DIPLOMATIC AGENDA 
The BWC, effective in 1975,11 had a very simple but straightforward 
objective –– to stop the production and possession of biological weapons by 
nations.12 It came at the end of a biological arms race that was openly 
moving forward into a frightening future of cataclysmic biological warfare. 
President Nixon ended the U.S. biological weapons program in 1969,13 
triggering closure of biological weapons programs in other nations also 
known to have them. Biological weapons were seen as a national security 
concern, rather than a public health concern, which at the time, was 
focused on clean water and childhood vaccinations. Domestic policy was 
very far from foreign policy in the area of potentially deadly diseases at this 
point in the political history for the U.S. 
The isolation of public health from foreign policy concerns about 
biological weapons meant that the U.S. considered public health to be “low 
 
 10. See generally Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, annex, General Principles for the 
Handling of Confidential Information, at 161, available at http://www.opcw.org/chemical-
weapons-convention/confidentiality-annex/ (describing general principles for handling 
confidential information). 
 11. The Biological Weapons Convention, U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/ (last visited November 13, 2013). 
 12. Id. 
 13. General Article, Nixon Ends Biological Weapons Program, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/weapon-nixon-ends/ (last visisted 
November 13, 2013). 
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politics” in diplomatic negotiations.14 These were issues that did not have 
priority, except for use as a type of political currency for trading for more 
important issues. Public health was typically helpful only to developing 
nations and regions of severe poverty, where poverty and lack of a public 
health infrastructure went hand-in-hand. 
A change in this perspective was triggered by a series of events 
beginning with the post-9/11 attack, which used anthrax spores in letters 
sent to legislators and members of the media in 2001.15 In 2003, the 
emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which created a 
global pandemic with an uncontrollable spread of a highly contagious viral 
disease with no vaccine and no effective treatment,16 was a stark realization 
that national security was potentially at risk. In 2004, the collapse of the 
negotiations for an inspection protocol for the BWC was largely led by the 
U.S., which left a void in the global view of how these weapons might be 
controlled.17 Also around this time, it became evident that there had been a 
misappropriation with Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program,18 which 
led to uncertainty in our ability to accurately assess the threat of biological 
weapons. Then, in 2008, the influenza vaccine shortage forced the U.S. to 
develop prioritization directives for which individuals would get the vaccine, 
presenting the problem of shortages of countermeasures.19 The Swine Flu in 
Mexico, which started in 2008, was declared a pandemic by the WHO in 
June 200920 with an announcement from the WHO Director stating, “We 
have evidence to suggest we are seeing the first pandemic of the 21st 
 
 14. David P. Fidler, Public Health and National Security in the Global Age: Infectious 
Diseases, Bioterrorism, and Realpolitik, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 787, 855 (2003). 
 15. Id. at 796. 
 16. See id. at 840. 
 17. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, G.A. Res. 59/110, 
¶ 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/110 (Dec. 3, 2004). 
 18. See Congresswoman Jane Harman, Ramking Member on the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, The Intelligence on Iraq’s WMD: Looking Back to Look 
Forward, Remarks before Los Angeles World Affairs Council (Feb. 16, 2004), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_cr/harman011604.html. 
 19. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CONTINUED SHORTAGE OF 
HAEMOPHILUS INFLUENZAE TYPE B (HIB) CONJUGATE VACCINES AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR 
HIB SURVEILLANCE—UNITED STATES 2008, 1 (2008). 
 20. Margaret Chan, M.D., Director-General, World Health, World Now at the Start of 
2009 Influenza Pandemic, Statement to the Press 1 (June 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase6_20090611 
/en/index.html. See also The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary Highlights, April 2009-April 
2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcre 
sponse.htm (last updated June 16, 2010). 
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Century.”21 This was a striking reminder that resources could be challenged 
and national security may be at risk if an unexpected pandemic emerges. 
The rise of public health emergencies and the realpolitik of their effect 
on national security slowly became evident over the course of these events. 
But there was resistance to seeing national public health preparedness and 
response as anything other than a public health area of sovereignty for the 
states that was not to be encroached. Public health security responsibility 
was not something that the Department of Defense (DOD) wanted to 
assume. Clear evidence of this resistance can be seen in the action taken by 
the DOD immediately following the first anthrax attack, when the need to 
purchase antibiotics as a countermeasure was seen as a national defense 
need and for emergency defense procurements; the DOD provided the most 
ready mechanism. But in order to make purchases of the antibiotics, the 
anthrax attacks had to be classified as a threat to national security, and the 
DOD declined. This action would have enabled them to place antibiotics on 
the list of items that they could procure through defense purchases. Instead, 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) became the lead on 
responding to the need to purchase Cephalexin™ and amoxocillin, the two 
recommended drugs. 
Once the immediate need for antibiotics to treat anthrax exposure was 
met, Congress and the President turned to the problem of readiness for the 
next possible attack. A shift from the states to the federal government for 
national preparedness for national security never took place. HHS 
reorganized to establish a structure that could respond to national public 
health preparedness and emergencies.22 The NIH was given a research 
mandate that came with nearly $3.5 billion to immediately begin research 
and develop countermeasures.23 Both the short-term emergency 
preparedness needs and the long-term research strategies were 
implemented and represented as an incremental shift in federalism 
responsibility from the states to the federal government. The regulations that 
would follow for biosecurity would continue the shift to federal regulation of 
public health in particular areas, such as emergency releases. 
The resistance to moving any of the public health responsibility from the 
states to the federal government was also evident in the Department of 
 
 21. WHO Declares Swine Flu Pandemic, BBC NEWS, (June 11, 2009, 9:51 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8094655.stm. 
 22. HHS Reorganizes Bioterrorist Response Strategy, CAL. HEALTHLINE (Nov. 8, 2001), 
http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2001/11/8/hhs—reorganizes-bioterrorist-re 
sponse-strategy. 
 23. See Anthony S. Fauci, Bioterrorism: Defining a Research Agenda, 57 FOOD & DRUG L. 
J., 413, 416-17 (2002); Luciana L. Borio & Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Anthrax Countermeasures: 
Current Status and Future Needs, 3 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. 
& SCI., 102, 105 (2005). 
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Homeland Security (DHS), which had been “stood up” in 2003. Little 
attention was noted on the fact that nothing about the new DHS would 
address the anthrax attacks, which had been partially responsible for the 
movement to protect homeland security and the reorganization of the 
federal government into a DHS. Instead, DHS focused only on areas with 
existing federal jurisdiction, like agriculture and food, not public health, 
which still stayed rooted in state sovereignty, but incremental changes 
continued to push that norm. 
As experiences in public health emergencies increased over the decade, 
they were viewed from the realpolitik perspective on national security. Simply 
put, international cooperation on public health matters became expedient 
when it contributed to the state’s national security.24 The U.S. had begun to 
think of national security in terms of economics; even public health was seen 
through an economic lens. Interest in trade required an investment in public 
health responses to diseases that might be either spread through trade and 
travel or that might prevent the free flow of trade. Interest in supporting 
nations in need of public health resources remained particularly high where 
the U.S.’s assistance could preclude unfriendly nations from developing 
alliances from their support. Investments in the public health of other nations 
also became important to the protection of trade and to making investments 
in the support of countries’ public health infrastructure. 
The U.S. has participated in global health since the 1800s, most 
recently through the WHO Assemblies which tend to focus narrowly on the 
diseases that are most threatening.25 The list of reportable diseases among 
the WHO member nations included only smallpox, cholera, and plague,26 
and when these became rare, this mechanism of public health cooperation 
fell into disuse. There was very little need for it. 
Then, beginning in the 1970s, a dramatic change occurred in 
international travel. As air travel become more affordable, travel to 
international destinations increased approximately 400% between 1970 and 
2005.27 This had the inevitable effect of also increasing the travel of viruses 
and bacteria by approximately 400%, making it possible for any disease to 
travel around the world in less than 24 hours. The International Health 
Regulations (IHR) from 1969, were dusted off, and a plan to revise them 
 
 24. Fidler, supra note 14, at 841. 
 25. See Michael McCarthy, A Brief History of the World Health Organization, 360 LANCET 
1111 (2002). 
 26. See generally Joseph B. Greene, Report from Berlin – Plague, Smallpox, and Cholera 
in Various Countries, 16 PUB. HEALTH REPORTS 782, 782-83 (1901) (explaining that these three 
disease were prevalent in the early 1900s). 
 27. See JEAN-PAUL RODRIGUE ET AL., THE GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSPORT SYSTEMS (3d ed. 
2013), http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch7en/appl7en/ch7a3en.html. 
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was put into place after the SARS pandemic in 2003.28 By 2005, the revised 
IHRs,29 which were now binding on WHO member nations, stood ready to 
address newly emerging pandemics and threats of pandemics. 
The U.S. was criticized by some Americans because it allowed the WHO 
to dictate policy of public health management to a sovereign nation.30 
Other member nations had agreed to the same diminishment of sovereignty 
for the greater good; however, many nations feared this would open control 
of their domestic affairs and sovereign control over them to outside powers 
such as the U.S.31 Russia and China were particularly concerned.32 The 
interest in engaging with other nations for public health emergencies 
requires the U.S. to develop a biodiplomacy policy. This must consider not 
only the economics of providing public health resources, but to do so with 
an eye toward the self-interests of other nations in protecting their own 
sovereignty and maintaining control over their domestic affairs. 
It is clear that global biosecurity, including global public health and 
threats to national security, have pushed these issues into the “high politics” 
agenda of international diplomacy from its “low politics” status of just a few 
decades ago. The need to develop a diplomatic strategy to address this new 
heightened concern for national security, because of global public health 
threats, encompasses this emerging concept of biodiplomacy. Such a 
concept will serve the goals of the U.S. in accomplishing its diplomatic 
objectives, driven by realpolitik. 
III.  SIX TRENDS THAT ARE DRIVING BIODIPLOMACY 
There are six trends that have pointed to a cohesive strategy of 
biodiplomacy as an essential tool for global governance. It is distinguishable 
from diplomacy because it requires an expertise and knowledge of specific 
biological diplomatic histories, landmarks, and timelines, as well as cultures 
that lead to special insights and advice. Diplomatic skills are consistently 
 
 28. Ten Things You Need to Do to Implement the IHR, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
http://www.who.int/ihr/about/10things/en/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Rob Stein, WHO Gets Wider Power to Fight Global Health Threats, WASH. POST, May 
28, 2003, at A15. Stein reported that the actions by the World Health Organization “mark the 
first significant expansion of WHO’s power in more than three decades.” WHA56.28 “frees 
[the] WHO from having to wait until a country officially reports an international health threat 
before beginning countermeasures . . . and gives the agency the authority to begin ground 
inspections without a formal invitation.” See also World Health Org. [WHO], Revision of the 
International Health Regulations, WHA Doc. WHA56.28 (May 28, 2003), available at 
http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf_files/WHA56/ea56r28.pdf. 
 31. See Fidler, supra note 14, at 845-46. 
 32. Id. 
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called for in such a strategy, but they cannot be relied upon as a singular 
tool to address global biosecurity. 
Increasingly, nation-states and the global community are cognizant of a 
change in risk to the health of its people. It is becoming the normative 
understanding among nations that any infectious disease is not just one 
country’s problem. These trends have led to a new norm in understanding 
and recognition of this need. The following six concepts contribute to this 
overall shift. 
A. Global Public Health Commons 
The term “global public health commons” is an extension of the concept 
of the environmental global commons.33 The environmental global 
commons is the shared air that we breathe and the shared water through 
the water cycle — those natural resources that are held in common by all 
nations in the world. The water cycle, for example, does not recognize 
jurisdictional borders, nor can nations control the water cycle and its 
redistribution of water wealth through droughts and floods. So, too, 
infectious diseases and the vectors of infectious diseases (i.e., rats and birds) 
do not recognize the jurisdictions of nations and cross borders freely on 
food, animals, or humans. They wander freely and infect evolutionarily. A 
global public health commons is a dimension of human contact that defines 
the global public health commons which can also be the water cycle and 
the air. These commons can also be defined as spaces, such as the airspace 
of air travel where governmental jurisdictions change throughout the 
journey, crossing from one country to the next. 
These concepts were captured in the IHR, crafted to focus on infectious 
diseases and the establishment of normative behaviors of nations when such 
infectious diseases pose threats to other nations. The IHR of 2005 is reliant 
on diplomacy to affect many of its provisions, for example, the request for 
assistance must come from the nation to the WHO, and this requires 
ongoing dialogues with parties to the IHR in order to maintain 
communication to make such notice to the WHO more likely.34 
 
 33. Res communes, first articulated in the Supreme Court opinion Geer v. Conn., 161 
U.S. 519, 525 (1896), defined as “those things which were common to all belonged no more 
to one than to the others.” See also Owen J. Lynch & Greg Maggio, Human Rights, 
Environment, and Economic Development: Existing and Emerging Standards in International 
Law and Global Society, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW (1998), at § IV, available at 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/olp3iv2.html. The term “common heritage of mankind,” has 
also become a norm in international law. 
 34. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) (2nd ed. 2008) 
at 12, available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf. 
“The purpose and scope of the IHR (2005) are ‘to prevent, protect against, control and 
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B. Increased Air Travel, Refugees, and Mass Gatherings 
The precipitating factor in increasing opportunities for the spread of 
infectious diseases was certainly the explosion in international air travel, 
which increased 400% since the 1970s.35 Although it was unproven, the 
rapid spread of HIV/AIDs in the 1980s was attributed to air travel, and one 
flight attendant, fueling the fear that diseases could be transported via air 
travel.36 The idea that air travel was a vehicle for the beginning of deadly 
epidemics became a harsh reality by the end of the Twentieth Century. 
Beginning in the second millennia, in 2003, SARS was rapidly disseminated 
around the globe through air travel in a matter of days and to more than 
two dozen countries around the globe in two months.37 
The frequency of mass gatherings is also growing. The traditional Hajj 
has historically involved public health planning for a large gathering of 
people traveling thousands of miles to Saudi Arabia.38 Lessons from these 
early mass gatherings have been applied to Olympic events, other major 
sports events, religious pilgrimages, and political gatherings.39 The WHO 
has developed an expertise in this field through a cadre of experts who assist 
in planning these events, and diplomacy is vital to its success.40 The need to 
alter local public health and safety codes, and the necessary infrastructure to 
ensure safe food, water, and building capacity in response to public health 
emergencies is the type of emerging diplomacy which comes under the label 
of biodiplomacy, capturing the spirit of assisting for public health 
emergencies with a commitment to leave the nation better off than without 
the planning assistance.41 
Refugees, too, are increasing. Refugee camps are in close proximity with 
makeshift sanitary conditions and infrastructure. Because of the need to 
 
provide a public health response to the international spread of disease’” in part by requiring 
State Party’s to develop “certain minimum core public health capacities.” 
 35. See JEAN-PAUL RODRIGUE ET AL., supra note 27. 
 36. See generally David M. Auerbach et al., Cluster of Cases of the Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome, 76 AM. J. MED. 487, 489, 490 (1984) (clarifying that the flight 
attendant mentioned was Patient 0 who attributed to the rise in HIV/AIDS in the 1980s to do 
promiscuous behavior). 
 37. Alexandra Mangili & Mark A. Gendreau, Transmission of Infectious Diseases During 
Commercial Air Travel, 365 LANCET 989, 992 (2005). See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, FACT SHEET: BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT SARS 1 (2004). 
 38. Qanta A. Ahmed et al., The Quest for Public Health Security at the Hajj: The WHO 
Guidelines on Communicable Disease Alert and Response During Mass Gatherings, 7 TRAVEL 
MED. & INFECTIOUS DISEASE 226, 228 (2009). 
 39. Id. at 227. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT ON WHO SUPPORT TO THE 2010 FIFA WORLD CUP 
SOUTH AFRICA (2011). 
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address displaced persons due to war, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was formed by the United Nations 
(U.N.) to find practical solutions to the increasing problem of refugee 
populations with its new diplomatic authority.42 Refugee camps were 
becoming permanent communities, but lacked sewer and water 
infrastructures, making them opportunities for cholera outbreaks and other 
opportunistic diseases. The number of refugee camps is growing, while the 
return or permanent placement of refugees has scarcely been attempted.43 
This activity is outside the other WHO agencies and has displaced persons 
as its priority, but there is no doubt that public health emergencies must be 
dealt with diplomatically, seeking cooperation and assistance from member 
nations. 
C. Biotechnology Revolution, Genetically Modified Organisms, and 
Increasing Research 
Genetic engineering of all types and the isolation of bioregulators, 
which affect human physiological function and the explosion in the use of 
synthetic biology by the public, are unaddressed in any security regime. The 
concept of dual use in narrow application to research does not adequately 
capture these emerging areas of scientific research and the possibilities for 
good as well as harm. Biodiplomacy is called for to maintain 
communication and collaboration at the highest levels, from the bench 
scientist level to law enforcement to ensure common goals of public health 
and safety. This kind of diplomacy is based on trust and the culture of 
science in sharing information and scientific resources. 
Collaboration with scientists in foreign laboratories has raised questions 
about the biosecurity and biosafety of their laboratories, particularly when 
working with select agents –– those biological materials with potential dual 
use. The grants from NIH were made conditional to meet certain biosafety 
and biosecurity requirements, and the CDC was tasked with developing a 
compliance protocol.44 However, the effort to have the CDC inspect 
laboratories before the scientists in foreign laboratories could work with U.S. 
scientists raised concerns that the U.S. was seeking to extend its jurisdiction 
 
 42. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, An Introduction to International Protection: 
Protecting Persons of Concern to UNHCR, at 7 (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b 
d5a0.pdf. 
 43. U.N. High Comm’r on Refugees, UNHCR Global Trends 2012: Displacement The 
New 21st Century Challenge, at 35 (June 19, 2013), http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013/ 
UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012_V05.pdf; U.N. High Comm’r on Refugees, 
UNHCR 2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and 
Stateless Persons, at 2-3 (June 15, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html. 
 44. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT IIA-34-IIA35 (Oct. 2012). 
See 42 U.S.C. § 262a(c) (2011). 
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outside of the U.S. by exerting regulatory authority over laboratories in other 
sovereign jurisdictions.45 While the reality is that this is simply a condition for 
receiving grant money, the perception of the U.S. intruding on other nations’ 
sovereignty called for a better biodiplomatic strategy to demonstrate that this 
was not an attempt by the U.S. to extend jurisdictional authority outside U.S. 
borders. This is another example of where biodiplomacy and its unique 
needs have not been fully met. 
Restrictions on publication of what is considered to be biological 
research that might be used by terrorists has raised concerns that the 
Constitutional First Amendment,46 freedom to publish, was too heavily 
burdened by attempts to restrict publication. If free speech is to be 
burdened, there is a high threshold to meet to show that the publication is a 
threat to national security. However, efforts were also made to restrict 
authors outside the U.S. from gaining knowledge by editing their articles in 
the U.S., and making a determination that this was a “deemed export” for 
purposes of restricted exports to listed countries under the U.S. Arms Export 
Control Act.47 Eventually, Secretary Condoleezza Rice announced that a 
previous Executive Order prevented restricting the free exchange of scientific 
information, and the rule was narrowed.48 However, in 2013, the definition 
of “dual use technologies” under three import-export regimes in the U.S. 
complicated and confused maintaining trade and research relations with 
other nations and companies.49 Dual use technologies as a defined 
category has not provided clarity in this regulatory regime of import and 
export processes, and ultimately, other criteria will need to be developed. 
The categorization of dual use technologies is also based on an assumption 
of ill intent and sends a message of mistrust. The failure of biodiplomacy in 
these cases caused a considerable loss of good will among scientists. 
 
 45. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, SELECT AGENT 
POLICY FOR FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/researchfunding/qa/pages/sela 
gentfor.aspx (last updated Jan. 9, 2013). 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 47. CONTROL OF ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2011); Benjamin Carter 
Findley, Revisions to the United States Deemed-Export Regulations: Implications for 
Universities, University Research, and Foreign Faculty, Staff, and Students, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
1223, 1229, 1241-42 (2006). 
 48. Jessica Stern, Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons, 27 INT’L. 
SECURITY, Winter 2002-2003, at 117. 
 49. See Position Statement, IEEE-USA, Reforming Technology Export Controls and 
Deemed Export Policy (Sept. 19, 2012) available at http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/positions/ 
ExportControls0912.pdf. 
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D. Modern Bioterrorism 
The U.N.’s process for filing complaints regarding the use of biological 
weapons has never been used. However, the consultative process has been 
the choice of nations in resolving disputes. Cuba, for example, has brought 
22 complaints of the use of biological terrorism by the U.S. without utilizing 
the formal process.50 Why has this mechanism never been used, and why 
has the consultative method been utilized? The U.N.’s process for making 
formal complaints has all but ensured that no one will ever file a complaint. 
The BWC lacks an inspection and verification protocol, which led to the 
development of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) after failing to reach 
an agreement on an inspection protocol.51 CBM is an example of 
biodiplomacy. 
The use of the U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 
mechanism has been the result of biodiplomatic efforts to respond to a gap 
in the BWC,52 which lacks a verification mechanism. The UNSCR 1540 
mechanism was utilized in the inspection of the Iraq biological weapons 
program after significant intelligence led the U.N. member states to 
conclude that there was still such a program underway in Iraq. 
E. Emerging Infectious Diseases 
Emerging infectious diseases have always been with us, but a number of 
factors, like the increase in international travel, increase in population 
density, and the close exposure to animals with humans, have made 
emerging infectious diseases possible. Disrupting habitats of some of the 
richest biodiversity areas in the world causes migration and movement of 
species that have been isolated, risking viral mutations and species-jumping 
of viruses, which brought us such deadly viral diseases such as SARS, bird 
flu, and the Nipah virus.53 In order to conduct surveillance globally, 
diplomacy is required to ensure ongoing communication and the 
transmission of findings in a context of trust. Gathering surveillance 
information from state governments in the U.S. is so difficult that the U.S. 
still lacks a national disease surveillance system, hampered by our system of 
 
 50. Elisa D. Harris, TERRORISM, WAR, OR DISEASE? UNRAVELING THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL 
WEAPONS 223 (Anne L. Clunan et al. eds., 2008). 
 51. Marie I. Chevrier, Doubts About Confidence: The Potential and Limits of Confidence 
Building Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention, in THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION: REASONS FOR CONCERN, COURSES OF ACTION 52, 56 
(1998). 
 52. See James D. Fry, Dionysian, Disarmament: Security Council WMD Coercive 
Disarmament Measures and Their Legal Implications, 29 MICH. J. IN’L L. 197, 243-44 (2008). 
 53. See M. L. Flanagan et al., Anticipating the Species Jump: Surveillance for Emerging 
Viral Threats, 59 ZOONOSES & PUB. HEALTH 155, 157 Table 1(b) (May 2011). 
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federalism that has yet to yield to the demands of modern transportation of 
diseases.54 The difficulty in asking sovereign nations for their surveillance 
data is equally, if not more so, a demand on diplomatic skills. 
Understanding the science and reasons for the need for this surveillance 
data is captured by the biodiplomacy concept. 
The continuing loss of our arsenal of antibiotics and the few anti-virals 
against diseases with antibiotic resistant organisms, and the still slow 
development of vaccines in response to emerging diseases has further 
complicated our ability to be prepared, but increased our need for 
diplomacy in a context of trust. 
F. Public Health Disasters and Environmental Disasters 
Biodiplomacy is essential to get the right kind of help for environmental 
disasters. A failure to use biodiplomacy can compound the disaster if the 
advice is not timely, biased for political purposes, or fails to follow 
international norms and laws. Failures of responding to public health 
disasters may be the result of poor planning, deficient or non-existent public 
health infrastructure in the country, or uncertainties in governance as to who 
is responsible for what. 
IV.  GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE USE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BIODIPLOMACY 
The DURC program in the U.S. focuses on a culture of mistrust, which is 
counterintuitive to the research community that has always been built on a 
culture of sharing, trust, and openness. By targeting equipment and 
biological agents for dual use determinations through treaties and domestic 
laws, the importance of process is overlooked. Translating DURC to the 
international community spreads the culture of mistrust that comes with the 
concept. 
Moves toward globalized governance exist when common concerns in 
global public health commons cannot be effectively addressed through 
sovereign spheres of action alone. Shared governance in a global quasi-
jurisdiction are pushed forward, yet it relies almost exclusively on the 
sovereignty of nations to use their sovereign powers of civil and criminal 
law, and enforcement to address the individuals who might engage in illegal 
activities. 
The term “dual use” can quickly become diluted and lose its focus. 
Essentially the double-edged sword analysis of each of these applications 
 
 54. Victoria Sutton, BIOTERRORISM: Bioterrorism Preparation and Response Legislation—
The Struggle to Protect States’ Sovereignty While Preserving National Security, 6 GEO. PUB. 
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demonstrates the problem. Some examples are: (1) Transportation Security 
— commerical aircraft can become deadly killing machines; (2) 
Cybersecurity — the Internet can be used for vital life-saving 
communication, but also used to shut down a nation’s power-grid, and air 
traffic control system; (3) Nuclear Security –– uranium enrichment facilities 
can be used to fuel nuclear power plants, but they can also be used to fuel 
nuclear warheads (at a higher quality); (4) Biosecurity –– biotechnological 
fermenters can make babyfood as well as bioweapons. 
Realpolitik predicts that the most urgent of these will rise to the top of the 
diplomatic agenda in meetings and negotiations as immediate national 
security concerns. But there are important differences between biosecurity 
and the other threats in the preceding examples. 
By far, the dual use of uranium enrichment by Iran has been at the top 
of the diplomatic agenda and in the news more than any other issue, and 
the focus is on its dual use. Graham Allison, the founding Dean of 
Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and a leading expert on 
nuclear proliferation, told a New York Times reporter: 
Nuclear terrorism is a preventable catastrophe, and the reason it’s 
preventable is because the material to make a nuclear bomb can’t be made 
by terrorists. But in the bio case — oh, my God! Can I prevent terrorists 
from getting into their hands anthrax or other pathogens? No! Even our best 
efforts can’t do that.55 
A report by the Congressional Commission on the Prevention of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism concluded: “To 
date, the U.S. government has invested most of its nonproliferation efforts 
and diplomatic capital in preventing nuclear terrorism. The commission 
believes that it should make the more likely threat — bioterrorism — a 
higher priority.”56 
Biodiplomacy, then, is unique and requires risk communication, threat 
assessment, and comparative risk among the set of skills, as well as 
knowledge of the biosafety and biosecurity history of regulation and treaties, 
which also requires a reasonably good knowledge of the life sciences in this 
context. Diplomatic assignments should include a specialized staff 
assignment for biodiplomacy with these requisite skills. The moniker of “dual 
use” can only serve a limited purpose in addition to the damage it creates 
by the negative distrust that is generated by the assumptions of the term. 
 
 
 55. Wil S. Hylton, How Ready Are We for Bioterrorism?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2011, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/how-ready-are-we-for-bioterror 
ism.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&. 
 56. THE COMM’N ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION 
AND TERRORISM, WORLD AT RISK 24 (1st ed. 2008). 
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The problem of dual use is captured in a popular medium of this 
political cartoon,57 demonstrating that there are a wide range of dual use 
definitions that can dilute and make ineffective the use of the term “dual 
use” in a culture built on trust. 
V.  FOCUS ON REALPOLITIK ISSUES BY MAKING 
RISK-BASED DECISIONS IN A CONTEXT OF TRUST 
Since the interpretation of world governance through the beginnings of 
international law, the recognition of nations’ sovereignty was made clear.58 
The acceptance that the world would be governed by a collection of nations 
and that power would be held by the nation-state has centered power over 
individuals in the sovereign jurisdiction of nations. International governance 
continues to be enforced primarily through diplomatic pressure and politics 
in the framework of a collection of treaties. Sovereign nations’ strength of 
the rule of law provides domestic enforcement of international norms. But 
the strength of the rule of law varies so much from one nation-state to 
another that domestic law enforcement is not a sufficient approach. This 
alone challenges the notion that dual use as a criteria for enforcement 
 
 57. Eldon Pletcher, Iran’s Uranium Enrighment Program is Strictly for Medical 
Resear. . .Oops!, available at http://www.cartoonstock.com/newscartoons/cartoonview.asp? 
catref=epln1434. 
 58. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 62 (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901) 
(1625). 
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cannot operate in a country with a weak rule of law or where the strength of 
the rule of law is uncertain or insufficient. 
During the BWC’s Second Meeting, a decision was made to utilize 
CBMs to implement Articles V and X of the BWC.59 This was followed by a 
re-invention of a mechanism to report CBMs in the Sixth Meeting.60 These 
reported activities by member nations about their activities, including the 
passage of domestic laws, are mandatory to ensure compliance with the 
BWC and engender confidence in their full compliance. A wide range of 
activities could qualify as long as they are intended to bring confidence and 
assurances of compliance. Dual use oversight is a more narrow focus within 
the CBMs. The U.S., for example, would include the DURC program among 
the CBMs in carrying out their obligations under the BWC. Some of these, 
like the DURC program, would qualify as a CBM: (1) Biosafety and 
Biosecurity Regulations, CDC, 42 CFR §73; (2) DURC program; (3) 
Transportation regulations for shipment of select agents, Department of 
Transportation; and (4) Import-Export Programs regulating dual use 
technologies and materials, the DOD, International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations list and the Department of Commerce commercial list. 
Although the CBMs are submitted with an agreement of confidentiality 
for attribution to the particular nation, the BWC Administrative Unit has 
published a list of the categories and types of measures taken under the 
CBM requirement without making specific attributions. This list of the status 
of implementation of the BWC documents that 18 of the 190 members had 
implemented measures to address dual use biological equipment and 
related technology.61 Import controls were the widest single mechanism used 
to control the threat of biological weapons.62 Fifty-nine member countries 
require authorization for export and import of dangerous biological agents 
and toxins.63 While these are impressive, it falls far short of compliance by 
the 190 members –– less than one third of the members have complied with 
the CBMs as a general observation from this data –– and much of this may 
be attributable to the range of the strength of the rule of law in the member 
nations.64 
The strength of the 141 weakest nations has been measured and ranked 
by the Brookings Institution using 20 factors in their report, one of which is 
 
 59. Second Review Confrence, supra note 8, at 7. 
 60. See Sixth Review Confrence, supra note 9, at 12. 
 61. See Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
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 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
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the strength of the rule of law.65 Capability and instability criteria can be 
gathered from the World Bank Index.66 The World Bank Index of the 
regulatory quality of nations67 –– a measure taken annually since 1996 –– is 
one criterion for the reliability of that nation to administer a dual use 
program of its biological activities, ranging from baby food to 
pharmaceuticals. 
One researcher combined other criteria that ranked measures of 
biotechnological skills, commercial development, and facilities as a method 
for identifying nations with capacity to develop biological weapons.68 This 
study created a four tier ranking of countries with biotechnological capability 
as a way of assessing the dual use concerns.69 The tiers were created using 
stability factors with “biotechnological potential.”70 The report describes 
these tiers with examples: 
Tier 1: Dominant biotechnology countries –– “The West:” U.S., Europe, 
Russia and offshoots (Japan, Australia). 
Tier 1A: Nations in developing world with significance biotech growth 
potential –– India and China. 
Tier 2: Countries with some biotechnology human and physical capabilities 
–– Israel, South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Singapore, 
Thailand, UAE, Dubai, Algeria, Egypt, Malaysia, Cuba, Sudan, Pakistan, 
Iran, North Korea. 
Tier 3: Countries with an interest but with little chance of developing civilian 
biotechnology commercial activities –– The rest of Latin America, Asia-
Pacific, Africa (island states, Mauritania, Caribbean states, Tanzania, 
Eritrea). 
Tier 4: Collapsed States –– Democratic Rep Congo; Somalia. 
*Note: The listed countries are designated to illustrate the type of countries 
in each category. This is not an exhaustive list of all countries with some 
biotechnology potential.71 
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Using the combination of the data of the 141 weakest nations from the 
Brookings Institution, along with the regulatory quality ranking of the World 
Bank Index, and the biological capability tiers, a risk assessment for 
potential biological weapons programs or non-state actors can be 
identified. 
Targeting nations that are unlikely or unable to enforce dual use 
programs because of the lack of strength of the rule of law and weak 
governments can be identified through research and targeted for assistance 
rather than imposing impossible standards for compliance with the BWC. 
VI.  FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
Early indications of this preliminary research of this data reveal some 
interesting propositions for utilizing a biodiplomacy concept. First, of the 
141 weakest nations in the Brookings Institution, the countries likely to have 
biological weapons programs, or be host to such activities, were almost 
exclusively in the bottom 50% of the weakest governments.72 Not only does 
this predict weak compliance with dual use criteria and the BWC, but it also 
supports the notion that biological weapons may be attractive as an 
“equalizer” for individuals in that nation or the nation itself. At any rate, 
weak governments are powerless to control these activities or safeguard its 
own research. More research is needed to correlate this data with 
“biological capabilities” identified through the tier ranking; for example, for 
better targeting for assistance, perhaps to implement Article X of the BWC. 
Another observation from this preliminary research is that of those 
countries suspected of having bioweapons programs or activities not in the 
bottom 50%, they had been open to inspection and destruction of these 
weapons (i.e., Libya); their government had collapsed (i.e., Egypt); or they 
went through a government and judicial cleansing, including a special 
judicial proceeding around their bioweapons program (i.e., South Africa). 
The political theory of realpolitik is where decisions are driven by 
political expediency and economics drives the importance of a concept of 
biodiplomacy, with the new concerns of public health moving from low 
politics to high politics. But it is still political expediency and national security 
driving the agenda, not concern for global public health.73 
Biodiplomacy has some unique attributes that are just beginning to be 
appreciated as a distinct set of skills and goals. The strategy of approaching 
nations at the highest risk of being threats to global public health, because 
of the combination of factors indicating biological capacity with indicia of 
governmental instability and a weak rule of law in the context of past 
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examples of the nations of highest risk for biosafety and biosecurity 
breaches, suggests more studies should be done along these lines. Dual use 
criteria cannot reach these nations of highest concern. 
The use of biodiplomacy to cast a broad net over issues that may prove 
to be threatening to national and global security in the context of building 
diplomatic relationships and trust will engender collaborative and collective 
communication among the specialized individuals in the life sciences and 
clarity among nations, both with the strongest to the weakest rule of law 
governments. Biodiplomacy can establish a process of engagement that 
would engender trust rather than institutionalizing distrust through dual use 
concepts among many nations that have no capacity to enforce its criteria. 
 
